The Subsidiarity: A View from Below

Abstract

This article examines the application of the principle of subsidiarity out of a member state’s point of view. It observes the distinction in the nature of the different types of competences conferred to European Union and traces the role – if any – of member-states’ participation in their exercise. The analysis is based on the assumption that once agreed to sovereignty transfer towards the Union (Van Gend&Loos), the member states would try to minimize its further limitation by keeping their own legislative fi eld at its broadest scope. The subsidiarity is viewed both as a principle and a legal rule specifying in which case which level – EU or member state, should be competent to legislate. The article explores the development of the Union’s primary legislation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. It accentuates the broader powers granted to the National parliaments to object the projects of community acts on the base of subsidiarity infringement (so called subsidiarity early warning mechanism).