Different Ideas About Language: A Comparative Study of *Additions II* and *III D* to the Anonymous Early Modern Play *Sir Thomas More* and Its Modernized Version in The *Complete Oxford Shakespeare*

Abstract:

*Additions II and III D to the anonymous early modern play Sir Thomas More are believed by many influential scholars to be the only poetic text penned in Shakespeare’s own hand that has made it to our times. The critical interest in this text, however, has been almost exclusively directed towards supporting or questioning Shakespeare’s authorship. The present study sets aside this controversy and explores the particularities of the original text against the background of one of its most popular modernized versions to uncover fundamental differences between the author’s idea about language and that of the modernizing editor – a representative of our own times.*

Trying to comprehend a literature written more than four centuries ago, sooner or later we reach Granville-Barker’s conviction that “the literature of the past is a foreign literature, we must either learn its language or suffer it to be translated” (7). The present study explores these two approaches to a literary text composed in England, most probably in the nineties of the XVI century, delving into the obvious differences between the original and its translation into modern English to uncover deeper cognitive dissimilarities, the knowledge of which carries the potential of both transforming and enhancing our reading of early modern literature.

The text in question is the anonymous play *Sir Thomas More*, which enacts key scenes of the eventful life and the untimely death of the martyr. It reaches the present day in a single manuscript, MS. Harley 7368, now kept at the British library, which consists of different fragments and revisions penned in different hands by different people, most probably at different times. Two short fragments, *Addition II D* and *Addition III D*, a scene and a soliloquy, have attracted the attention of scholars as early as the middle of the XIX century. A possibility has been recognized that the first of these fragments may be the only remaining poetic text written in William Shakespeare’s own hand, while the second one a direct transcript of Shakespeare’s original. The presented graphological, orthographic and stylistic evidence either supports or questions Shakespeare’s authorship. Unfortunately, little research
is dedicated to analyzing the fragments beyond the shadow of this controversy, in their own right as literary texts telling their own story – which to my mind contains their greatest value. For regardless of whether William Shakespeare is the author of *Addition II* and *III D*, or they were written by a contemporary with no lesser talent – the original manuscript of a play or poem is our only chance to catch a glimpse on the creation process of a literature so far from us in time.

What strikes us the most, even at our first glance on the manuscript (or its transcription), is its pervasive orthographic fluidity:

Lincolne Peace heare me, he that will not see [a] [red] hearing a[t] a harrygrote, butter at a levenp[enc] e a p[ounde] [meale] [at] nyne shilling(e)s aBushell and Beeff at fower [nobles] [a] [stone] [lyst] to [me]

_Sir Thomas More, Add.II.D.1-3ii_

The language seems to flow with the facility of speech: *harrygrote, a levenpence, aBushell*. It should be the mind, rather than the eye, that could capture the difference between _hearing_ < _heare_ – OED perception by the ear or auditory sense: SHAKES. _L.L.L._ II.i.75: Aged eares play treuant at his tales, and yonger hearings are quite rauished – and _herring_, as in “red herring”. We can hypothesise, of course, that the pronunciation of the two words in some dialects of early modern English was so similar that people, or at least the writer of Addition II.D, simply did not distinguish between them phonetically, and hence – orthographically. The latter is most probably the case concerning _on_ – OED _prep._ above or in contact with, supported by – and _on_ – OED a variant spelling of _one_ – _numeral. pron._ – that appear visually undistinguishable later on in the manuscript:

Lincolne a plaigue on them they will not hold their peace the deule

Cannot rule them[iii] [Add. II.D. 52]

not [on] [of] [you] [heare] present

had there such fellowes, lyv[d] [w] hen you wer babes

that could haue topt the p[eace] as nowe you woold [Add. II.D. 61-63]
and by this patterne
not on of you shoold lyve an aged man

for other ruffians as their fancies wrought
wth sealf same hand sealf reasons and sealf right
woold shark on you

The two *ons* emulate each other across spans of text, drawing closer and closer until eventually they come together, right next to each other, in *one* and the same line:

and men lyke ravenous fishes
woold feed on on another

This curious collocation suggests an important observation – the twin look of the two words disturbed neither the penman, nor his readers at the time. Apparently no one felt the urge to mark them apart until the text made it to the twentieth century – when the modernizing editor was confronted with the choice whether to transcribe the line “would feed *one* on another” or “would feed on *one* another”. The issue may seem of small import here but the case is not that clear, for instance, in Shakespeare’s *King Richard II*, 1st Folio, 2122: “I, no; no, iiv.”

In contrast to the described orthographic uniformity, the manuscript of *Sir Thomas More’s* Addition II.D provides two exuberant examples of orthographic variation:

Linco our *Countrie* is a great eating *Country*, argo they eate more in
our *Countrey* then they do in their owne

Line *Shreiff* moor speakes shall we heare *shreef* moor speake
Doll Lett(e)s heare him [a] keepes a plentyfull shrevaltry, and a made my
Brother Arther watch[ins] Seriant S[af] es yeoman let(e)s heare ] *shreeve* moore
all *Shreiue* moor moor more *Shreue* moore

From the stance of our highly literate culture, the phenomenon of orthographic variation seems to be an almost childishly irrational imperfection. Our essential conception of language as a static written thing, characterized by its very lack of fluidity, is the proud product of an
overpowering process of linguistic standardization that has taken roughly the five centuries between 1300 and 1800 to complete. The result of this development is an imposing linguistic prescriptivism: “We are conditioned to associate minute variations with absolute shifts in meaning:” its/it’s, be/bee, two/to/too (Jonathan Hope, 2004). This prescriptivism has made us naturally intolerant, or at least suspicious, to the validity of ambiguous and multiple linguistic signs, which, however, is evidently not the case for the early modern writer of Addition II.D. It appears, however, that the carnivalesque processions of graphic variants: Countrie, Country, and Countrey in lines 6 and 7; and Shreiff, shreef, shreeve, Shreiue, and Shreue in lines 41 through 44 – do not partake to any modulations of meaningv – as in spite of their great visual diversity they seem to adhere to a uniform pronunciation. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that the concentration of so great a variegation within so little space is entirely accidental – it rather looks like the fruit of a creative impulse. But to what end?

In Shakespeare’s Talking Animals, Terence Hawkes argues that Early modern texts, particularly Shakespeare’s play texts, contain “ideas about language” which we tend to ignore “because we are anesthetized to them by our own educational experiences” (Terence Hawkes, 1973). His argument rests on the observation that the modern conception of language is inherently based on positivist logic – governing arbitrary in nature, discrete meanings – anchored distinctly to visually discrete written words, while contrastively, the early modern conception of language significantly depended on the inherent ambiguity and multivalence of the spoken word.

The impact that the spread of literacy has had on past and present societies’ cultural and cognitive processes has become over the last years a phenomenon of interest for anthropologists, philosophers, historians, and linguists alike. Most of the theories that have emerged essay to abstract universal principles of influence. On the one hand, writing and print have been seen as the main factor of secularization, industrial and economic growth, and the spread of democracy. On the other hand, they have been seen as intellectually levelling and even fossilizingvi. Either way, any general view fails to address the dynamic, two-way nature of the interaction between the speaking and writing, which is so characteristic of the early modern period – a period of transition between the oral and the literal set of mindvii. Therefore, while dealing with early modern texts, the interplay between speaking and writing is a crucial issue, but it needs be considered carefully in a specific context.
We are used to regarding Renaissance England as a time and place in which the new technology of print, the protestant faith, and the search back into classical thought stimulated an overpowering interest in texts, thus causing unprecedented advances in popular literacy. In fact, in Shakespeare’s England the highest estimates place adult male literacy at about 30 per cent (circa 50 per cent in London) \(^{viii}\) (Cressy, 1980), add most women and the proportion of even minimally literate people would fall considerably (Hope, 2004). The oral exchange was still the primary mode of receiving and conveying cultural wherewithal for most people – in M. C. Bradbrook’s words: the English of the time was still “a tongue rather than a written language” (M. C. Bradbrook, 1964).

This tongue was far from uniform. One of the most distinctive linguistic features of early modern England, often underestimated today, is its great diversity: “there were a multiplicity of different dialects, based upon geographical, occupational and social allegiances, which divided up the country into a complex configuration of overlapping ‘speech communities’. They could be markedly different in vocabulary, grammar, and phonology, each one expressing and encompassing quite distinct cultural contexts, the variety of the one reflecting the variety of the other” (Fox, 2000). It seems logical that the area of the thickest overlap between different cognitive and semantic models would have been the streets and squares of the capital. When we add to this the international intellectual cross-fertilization, characteristic of the times, and place the sum against the background of the tangible lack of an absolute standard, the linguistic ferment of London becomes as multilayered as a Brueghel painting and its meanings as multiple and infinite as Bruno’s universe.

The pattern of copious variety at the level of the spoken linguistic sign seems to have projected itself into the nature of early modern pre-standardized writing (Shreiff, shreef, shreeve, Shreiue, Shreue). Importantly, it seems to have disturbed neither the early modern writer, nor his or her readers. This suggests that early modern listening and reading audiences must have possessed a cognitive technique that helped them interpret the meaning in spite of the phonetic or graphic variation, a cognitive technique that had developed naturally in the pre-print world – a world lacking solid linguistic standards, but fraught with variety, multiplicity and mystery oozing in from the affluence of the environment and life itself. It seems possible that the cognitive technique in question has been recorded by theory and that we could get a closer glimpse at it in one of the most circulated and influential early modern Textbooks of Logic:
Substaunce, or beying, which Cicero calleth Nature, is a thing whiche standeth by it selfe, and needeth no helpe of an other, but hath his proper beying and substaunce naturally.

The substaunce receiueth by alteration of itselfe, and at sundrie times, diuerse and contrarie accidents and, and yet the substauce is not contrarie to the owne nature.

No substaunce can be seen with our yies, but onelie the outewarde Accidentes, whereby we iudge and knowe, euerie seuerall creature.

Could then the pre-literate, semiotic process depend on the belief in a dichotomy between: i) a complex unity of substance, essentially imperceptible to the senses, and ii) a multiplicity of its extensions – its diverse and sometimes even contrary accidents – that make part of tangible reality? If this is so, then both to the writer and to the reader of Addition II.D, 41-44 – the different graphic variants: Shreiff, shreef, shreeve, Shreiue, Shreue, were all commensurate extensions of the same abstract substance. In this respect, they differed little from its other accidents, such as, diverse phonetic variants, or different individuals who occupied the office at a different place and/or a different time.

It is important to note here that in the early modern period speaking always came first, even for the lettered: “Although profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life.” In early modern schools and universities one would first learn how to speak well before knowing how to write well. The training was centred on rhetoric, which was seen as a fusion of reason and eloquence needed to influence and control people’s minds. To function properly in the England of the time, a person had to possess these powers and perfect them as much as he or she could. It is no surprise, then, that the different versions of the early modern English Style Manual, ultimately based on Cicero’s De Oratore, Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, and the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium, were all essentially speaking guides, not writing guides. Nevertheless, it was from them that early modern penmen learned their art. One of the most likely effects of this may have been that much of the writing of the times inherited some of the underlying principles of speech.
Such a principle is copiousness. Before any English texts on rhetoric appeared, Erasmus wrote *De Utraque Verborum ac Rerum Copia* (On Copia of Words and Ideas) at the request of John Colet for the students at the newly established school of St Paul’s. The work was first published in 1512, but went through numerous editions leaving a deep imprint on early modern theory and practice. Its quintessential claim is that the most important skill in both speaking and writing is copiousness, for:

> if all things continually present themselves to the mind without variation, it will at once turn away in disgust. Thus the whole profit of a speech will be lost. This great fault will shun easily who is prepared to turn the same thought into many forms, as the famous Proteus is said to have changed his form…

Nothing is more admirable or more splendid than a speech with a rich *copia* of thoughts and words overflowing in a golden stream.

(Erasmus, 1963)

To illustrate the concept of *copia*, Erasmus provides a hundred and forty-eight variants of the sentence: ‘Your letter has delighted me very much.’

Besides the copiousness of graphic variants: *Shreiff, shreef, shreeve, Shreiue, Shreue*, and *Countrie, Country, Countrey*, in Addition II.D, we observe a heap of semantic copia: *a red herring at a Harry groat, butter at eleven pence a pound, meal at nine shillings a bushel, and beef at four nobles a stone* – each of these hypothetical scenarios displays a facet of the proposition that life may become more expensive. Together, they give a much fuller picture of this possibility. Perhaps this is what variation is about: explicating as many of the accidents of a given substance as possible – drawing it closer and infusing it with more and more actuality, more and more life. There is also another perspective on this phenomenon: in Henry Peacham’s *The Garden of Eloquence* the rhetorical figure accounting for such a heap is listed as *Partitio* and described as:

> a form of speech by which the orator divideth ye whole into parts, the subject into the accidents… The use of this forme of speech serveth to minister plentie and varietie of matter, and of many fountaines or figures of eloquution, there is not one that may be found more usefull then this, or more plentifull in the multitude of branches.

(Peacham, 1593)
John Hoskins, in his *Directions for Speech & Style*, lists the same figure as *Division* and quotes Francis Bacon:

> A way to amplify anything (quoth he) is to break it and make an anatomy of it into several parts, and to examine it accordingly to several circumstances.

(Hoskins, 1599)

Thus, the Protean nature of each substance licensed the simultaneous contemplation of a multiplicity of its forms, or accidents, both on the representational and on the semantic level, and empowered signification to mimic the flamboyant diversity, self-fashioning, and constant re-negotiation that characterized most cultural dimensions of the époque. This must have drawn the attention of early modern speakers and writers to the endless extension of meaning and encouraged their interpretational urge and semiotic enthusiasm.

Being used to comprehend the substance through its possible accidents implies two things: i) the propensity to divide concepts into potential parts, and ii) the ability to let all these parts inform simultaneously one’s understanding of the concept. This epistemological practice was naturally applied to language as well, and it must be in it that one of the major differences between the *literate* and the *pre-literate* attitude towards language lies. In a culture dominated by a standardized spoken and written language, we are used to having discrete signs pointing at discrete entities, while in the linguistically fluid and pre-standardized early modern culture – discrete signs often pointed at one and the same entity without obvious modulation of meaning, or one sign usually sustained the potential access to a number of entities without preference or order.

It is the claim of the present theory that these two closely related characteristics of the early modern attitude to language both engendered and reinforced a literary technique – pervasive in late medieval and renaissance texts, and very particular to Shakespeare – a literary technique depending on a constant division of substance into accidents, a literary technique whose fundamental constructive tool was the *pun*, or “the breaking down to bits” of meaning.

Traditionally, a *pun* is considered to be the use of a word in such a way as to suggest two or more meanings or different associations so as to produce a humorous effect, a pun is consumed in the act of producing and perceiving it. Hence, the opinion that the pun is nothing but a illusionist trick that hardly stretches beyond its comic upshot, and more importantly,
does not really lead the reader anywhere – the most famous objection of this sort with regard to Shakespeare is Dr. Johnson’s:

A quibble is to *Shakespeare*, what luminous vapours are to the traveller; he follows it at all adventures; it is sure to lead him out of his way, and sure to engulf him in the mire. It has some malignant power over his mind, and its fascinations are irresistible… A quibble was to him the fatal *Cleopatra* for which he lost the world, and was content to lose it\textsuperscript{xii}.  

(Dr. Samuel Johnson, 1765)

This comment records minutely the bias of changing times: such an exceptionally gifted and dedicated reader of Shakespeare as Dr. Johnson was not content to lose the clear unambiguous pattern of representation for a critical theory that could allow a sign to hold simultaneously a variety of meanings\textsuperscript{xiii}.

Ever since, it has been observed by Shakespeareans that i) Shakespeare’s puns are not necessarily comic (Muir, 1951); ii) their representational potentials form patterns that stretch far beyond the moment of their realization and can inform the interpretation of seemingly unpunncial words (Mahood, 1957); and iii) they are peculiarly able to concentrate intensify and unfold a real-life moment’s situational and physical layers (Palfrey, 2005). The pun’s particular architecture is characterized by its folded multiplicity of possibilities. Its potential significations spawn and sprout as it is analyzed and point towards different pasts and futures. Each pun posits a microcosm of interpretations: a multiple *virtuality* to rival a linear *actuality*.

In lines 14-18 of Addition III to *Sir Thomas More*, a beautifully written speech in which the protagonist soliloquizes on his life and personal achievements, the facsimile edition reads:

\begin{verbatim}
the more thou hast
ether of honor office wealth and calling
wch might accite thee to embrace and hugg them
the more doe thou in serpents natures thinke them
feare ther gay skinns wth thought of ther sharpe STATE\textsuperscript{xiv}
\end{verbatim}

*Sir Thomas More,*

Add.III.D.14-18
To the modern editor the word “state” obviously didn’t make sense, so he changed it to “stings” in the Oxford Complete Shakespeare edition. To rule out the possibility for incidental mistake or bad spelling on part of the writer, it is enough to observe that the last three lines of the soliloquy (lines 16-21) form three rhyming couplets:

wch might accite thee to embrace and hugg them
the more doe thou in serpents natures thinke them
feare ther gay skinns wth thought of ther sharpe state
And lett this be thy maxime, to be greate
Is when the thred of hazard is once Spun(n)
A bottom great woond vpp greatly vndonn.

of which lines 18 and 19 form the middle one: the word “state” at the end of line 18 bearing the rhyme with “greate” at the end of line 19. This fact makes it unlikely for “state” to have ended up in its place unintentionally. The context of the phrase obviously provides enough information for the modern editor to have guessed one of the possible meanings of “state” and reinforce the image of the serpents by adding a pair of explicit teeth. However, by doing so he has robbed the image of its ambiguous quality. OED gives as one of the possible meanings of “state” – property, possession, and quotes Shakespeare [SHAKES. Henry IV, I: Were it good to set the exact wealth of all our states All at one cast?] – hence the serpents’ sharp possessions, or fangs, which are as well their state, or estate – their inheritance from their Biblical ancestor who incited man’s first disobedience. The substance of the literary concept of state, however, just like a piece of cheveril, stretches further and further out: OED a particular manner or way of existing, a condition [SHAKES. Sonn. xxix: I all alone bewepe my out-cast state.]; [MARLOWE. Doctor Faustus, Sc. xiii: Ambitious fiends, see how the heaven smiles At our repulse and laughs your state to scorn!], or the condition of one’s health [SHAKES. Sonn. cxviii: And brought to medicine a healthful state.] – either of which may account for a particular sort of temper or mood [SHAKES. Sonn. xxix: Yet in these thoughts my self almost despising, Haply I think of thee, and then my state (Like to the lark at break of day arising From sullen earth) sings hymns at heaven’s gate.] Thus, the “sharp state” of the serpents can be, on the one hand, their “woeful state” [SHAKES. Sonn. cxlv], and on the other, their quick and keen temper. Furthermore, being confronted with speech preoccupied with the effects of stately power, it is difficult to resist the strong political connotations of the word [SHAKES. Henry IV, I: This chair shall be my state, this dagger my scepter, and this cushion my crown;
SHAKES. *Henry IV*, II: Down royal state; *Ibid*. And, as you are a king, speak in your state
What I have done that misbecame my place. *Ibid*. Our coronation done, we will accite, As I
before rememb'red, all our state.] What is more, it is peculiar that the word “state” that so
conveniently combines the accidents of country, nobility, royal power, and even the body
politic of the prince himself in our text is only used with reference to the serpents’ venomous
stings. This casts a slightly different light on “honor office wealth and calling” – all these
accidents of stately rank at the “Countries head” are granted by the Countries head, or the
king himself.

Is there a covert yet sharp warning *stated* in “state”? We cannot be certain – but clearly there
is the possibility for this and in order to be able to decide for ourselves we should bear in
mind that:

> A *state* therefore generally, is the chiefe ground of a matter, and the principall point
whereunto both he that speaketh should referre his whole wit, and they that heare
should chiefly marke.

(Wilson, 1560)

The theoretical dimension of “state” that Wilson expounds in the context of rhetoric derives
from early modern legal theory:

in matters criminall, where judgement is required: there are two persons at the least,
which must through contrarietie stand and rest vpon some issue. As for example. A
seruing man is apprehended by a Lawyer for Felonie, vpon suspition. The Lawyer
saith to the seruing man: thou hast done this Robberie. Nay (saith he) I haue not done
it. Vpon this conflict and matching together ariseth this *State*, whether this seruing
man hath done this Robberie, or no?

(Wilson, 1560)

The parallel is very telling: in order to allow for a fair judgment, the reader (or viewer) should
be able to hear the *state* and be made aware of all potential possibilities arising from it.
However, there is a crucial difference: Forensic theory, on the one hand, is preoccupied with
the truth value of each proposition, i.e. the serving man either did the *Robberie*, or did not do
it – it is the duty of lawyers to find out which of the two possible scenarios was realized in the
actual world, and to discard the other. Literature (or art in general), on the other, juggles with multiple possibilities to a quite different end – heaping together explicit or implicit accidents, it aims at a more comprehensive knowledge of substances – entities by definition far removed from actuality, mapping out into the region of human abstraction. This is why literary possibility is far greater than actual possibility: The literary state whether “state” in line 18 of Addition III to Sir Thomas More points towards the country’s head, the king, his nobles, their power and pomp, or puts a final touch to the serpents image adding to it their inherited stance of corruption, quick temper, and sharp, venomous teeth – should not be regarded as a legal state that requires one-sided critical decision; what is more, such a decision can seriously impair the interpretative potential of the text.

Notes on the text

i H. Granville-Barker, Associating with Shakespeare, Oxford University Press, 1932.


iii My italics – here and onwards.

iv For an extensive discussion of this phrase see AS King Richard II, Charles R. Forker, Ed., pp. 399, 61,88-9; and also Shakespeare’s Wordplay, M. Mahood, p. 87.

v I find the idea that the orthographic variation in lines 6 and 7, and 41 to 44 is used for the purpose of characterization unlikely on the grounds that similar variation (although on a lesser scale) is observed also in More’s speech (See lines 108-112).

vi See, to name but the most influential, Jacques Derrida, La dissemination, Paris, 1972.

vii See Ong, 1958.

viii It is important to note that such estimates rely heavily on the relative percentages of people able to sign their name in public documents (Brink, 97), which naturally does not tell us anything about the degree of their literacy.

ix The structure abstracted by Wilson goes ultimately back to Aristotelian dualism: The existing substance (ousia) is of three kinds: i) non-determinable matter (hule); ii) form (eidos), due to which an object is the-what-it-is (to te estin); iii) the assembly of both (amfoin). Matter is characterized by possibility, potentiality (dunamis) and form is the realization, actualization of matter, or the act of matter (entelecheia).

x Francis Bacon in Vickers, 1982.
Those being the best that admit of most senses” (George Sandys, *Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, Mythologiz’d and Represented in Figures*) – as Sir John Harrington’s reading of the slaying of the Gorgon Medusa by Perseus shows:

*Perseus* sonne of Jupiter is fained by the Poets to have slain *Gorgon*, and, after that conquest achieved, to have flown up to heaven. Th ehistoricall sence is this, *Perseus* the sonne of *Jupiter*, by the participacion of *Jupiters* vertues which were in him, or rather coming of the stock of one of the kings of Creet, or Athens so called, slew *Gorgon*, a tyrant in that country (*Gorgon* in Greeke signifieth earth), and was for his virtuous parts exalted by men up unto heaven. Morally it signifieth this much: *Perseus* a wise man, son of Jupiter, endewed with vertue from above, slayeth sinne and vice, a thing base & earthly signifieth by Gorgon, and so mounteth up to the skie of virtue. It signifies in one kind of Allegorie thus much: the mind of man being gotten by God, and so the childe of God killing and vanquishing earthlinesse of this Gorgonicall nature, ascendeth up to the understanding of heavenly things, of high things, of eternal things, in which contemplacion consisteth the perfection of man: this is the naturall allegory, because man [is] one of the chiefe works of nature. It hath also a more high and heavenly Allegorie, that the heavenly nature, daughter of Jupiter procuring with her continuall motion corruption and mortality in the inferiour bodies, served itself at last from these earthly bodies, and flew up on high, and there remaineth for ever. It hath also another Theological Allegorie: that the angelical nature, daughter of the most high God the creator of all things, killing and overcoming all bodily substance, signified by Gorgon, ascended unto heaven.

(Sir John Harrington, 1591)

*My capitals.*
Bibliography


